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BEYOND BACKLASH: THE
CONSEQUENCES OF ADJUDICATING
MEGA-POLITICS
KAREN J. ALTER* & MIKAEL RASK MADSEN**
I
INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the implications of adjudicating mega-politics for the
case at hand, for the larger mega-political issue, for the normative order of
international law, for domestic politics, and for the international courts (ICs) that
adjudicate these types of cases. While it offers a different angle on the question
of ICs’ involvement in mega-political disputes than the other articles in this issue,
it also provides a conclusion to this special issue: The International Adjudication
of Mega-Politics. As such, its goal is to offer a more general account of the
consequences of ICs’ embroilment in mega-political issues and disputes.
The adjudication of mega-politics is the phenomenon of courts becoming
involved in issues of outright and utmost political significance that divide
countries or societies.1 Unlike the situation of high politics, which involves
existential topics that lie at the heart of sovereignty and deeply concern executive
branches (for example, security and sovereign prerogatives), an issue is megapolitical because it is both divisive and engages society and often, although not
always, governments. When ICs are called upon to adjudicate hotly-contested
and socially or politically divisive issues, they know well that no matter how they
rule, powerful actors and segments of society are likely to be frustrated or
disappointed.2 They are also well aware that resistance, contestation, and forms
of actual or symbolic backlash from disappointed parties might follow from such
involvement.
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1. Ran Hirschl, The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts, 11 ANN. REV.
OF POL. SCI. 93, 94 (2008). The framing article for this special issue adapts Hirschl’s definition for the
purposes of this study. See Karen J. Alter & Mikael Rask Madsen, The International Adjudication of
Mega-Politics, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 1–2.
2. A recent paper argues that in highly contested issue-areas—what are termed here as megapolitical conflicts—the concern with the outcome of the cases becomes paramount. See Mikael Rask
Madsen, Juan A. Mayoral, Anton Strezhnev & Erik Voeten, Sovereignty, Substance, and Public Support
for European Courts’ Human Rights Rulings, AM. POL. SCI. REV. (2021).
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The introductory article of this special issue argues that mega-political
disputes are the cases where ICs are least likely to be able to resolve the dispute,
and perhaps most likely to engender political backlash.3 For many reasons, ICs
cannot avoid being embroiled in mega-political disputes, but their involvement
comes with political and institutional risks. ICs can end up in critics’ crosshairs
because they perform their role as counter-majoritarian institutions by
interpreting and enforcing norms that put a brake on actors who violate
individual rights, create civilian casualties as a war tactic, or abrogate
international agreements they no longer like. While ICs’ involvement in megapolitical disputes is not new, it may be increasing because of international
judicialization trends, which have led to establishing a growing number of ICs
that have compulsory jurisdiction and offer access for non-state actors to initiate
litigation.4 In recent years, this trend has particularly clashed with the rise of
populism and nationalism, resulting in certain parties contesting the liberal
international script reflected in large swaths of international law.5 Hence, it may
be both inevitable and unavoidable that ICs will be seized by those who prefer
that international law be followed, much to the consternation of those who
understand sovereignty as conferring an international legal right to defend a
country’s national interests—however the government defines it—by whatever
means those parties deem necessary. All of this portends that the international
adjudication of mega-politics is a phenomenon that is likely to grow in
prevalence, perhaps provoking increased resistance to ICs.
This Article is focused on generalizing this special issue’s findings on the
consequences of IC involvement in mega-political issues. Generally, the special
issue’s collective findings challenge Ran Hirschl’s concerns about juristocracy,
which spurred his original interest in mega-politics. Hirschl was worried that
judicial intervention would instantiate elite hegemony in antidemocratic ways.6
This Article does not question his findings based on a comparative analysis of
constitutional courts. Yet, as it pertains to our specific focus on IC intervention
in mega-politics, this Article will argue that IC involvement, on balance, tends to
be democracy-enhancing. More specifically, the international adjudication of
mega-politics tends to engender or reinforce the rule of law, due process, and
human rights because of the ways in which ICs provide legal processes that
translate political opposition into legal categories and rights. This Article also
argues, contrary to the ‘most likely’ claims presented in the introductory article

3. Alter & Madsen, supra note 1.
4. See KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS,
RIGHTS 81-5 (2014) [hereinafter THE NEW TERRAIN]; Karen J. Alter, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton &
Laurence R. Helfer, Theorizing the Judicialization of International Relations, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 449, 450
(2019) [hereinafter Theorizing Judicialization].
5. See, e.g., David A. Lake, Lisa L. Martin & Thomas Risse, Challenges to the Liberal Order:
Reflections on International Organization, 75 INT’L ORG. 225, 236–41 (2021).
6. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (particularly chapters 1 & 6).
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of this special issue,7 that an IC’s involvement is not per se contributory to
backlash politics that target the IC. This is because ICs have many strategies that
can diffuse conflict, some of which are directly part of the core processes of
adjudication. By carefully employing legal strategies that convert a larger dispute
into a more tractable legal controversy, adjudication can, for example, transform
what for partisans is a larger conflict into a more limited and specific battle that—
at least to an extent—can be resolved. Resolving a piece of the underlying conflict
can reinforce specific international legal norms and the idea that adjudication can
helpfully resolve disputes, and it can contribute positively to the resolution of the
larger controversy.
Underlying differences between ICs and national constitutional courts may
help explain why IC involvement in mega-politics may mitigate Hirschl’s
concerns with juristocracy. To be sure, domestic judges can employ the very same
legal strategies that ICs use to convert a conflict into something that is legally and
politically tractable. Yet, in most cases, ICs’ rulings are not directly applicable in
national legal orders; instead, they have to go through a process of national
adaptation. This means that in practice, IC rulings may inevitably be filtered by
national institutions such as ministries of justice, attorneys general, and national
judges and courts, as well as international officials. This filtering process, where
international and domestic actors determine what compliance with an IC ruling
requires, can nudge the parties towards finding a middle ground that arguably
respects the IC ruling while satisfying (in part, if not in whole) opposing claims.
In other words, some (but not all) IC rulings provide an additional and external
element in the longer dispute resolution process that may help diffuse some of
the contestation surrounding the core conflict that triggered the lawsuit. The
Article returns to the effects of IC rulings on conflict resolution in Parts III and
IV.
Interestingly, backlash might also be mitigated by the same possibility of
working around or filtering an IC’s intervention. One reason that the
international adjudication of mega-politics seldom generates a broader political
backlash is because the filtering process may generate a compromise that is more
easily achieved than mobilizing support for changing international law or an IC’s
mandate. Backlash may also not be a likely outcome since international
adjudication reinforces a normative order that many stakeholders support.
Instead, these stakeholders will counter efforts to dejudicialize or weaken the
laws in question.8 So while IC involvement may in the short term provoke an
uproar that at first blush appears to exacerbate a conflict, in the long run IC
involvement may also provide a path out of conflict. These cautiously salutary

7. Alter & Madsen, supra note 1.
8. See Karen J. Alter, James T. Gathii & Laurence R. Helfer, Backlash Against International
Courts in West, East and Southern Africa: Causes and Consequences, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 293, 318–26
(2016); Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch, Backlash Against International Courts:
Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International Courts, 14 INT’L J. OF L. IN CONTEXT
197, 204 (2018).
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findings do not mean that the adjudication of mega-political disputes is
necessarily always the best way forward. It is usually better if stakeholders
resolve their disputes themselves as long as, in the process, they do not sacrifice
minority groups, vulnerable individuals, or the will of the people. The findings
do, however, mean that the international adjudication of mega-politics, while
deeply frustrating for political leaders and certain segments of society that would
prefer to ignore international law, is perhaps not something that should be
avoided wherever possible.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II draws on the conflict literature to set
reasonable expectations for an investigation of how IC intervention may impact
a mega-political issue. Part III draws on the contributions to the special issue to
show how and why international judicial intervention has varying impacts. Part
IV focuses on how ICs themselves are impacted by becoming embroiled in megapolitics disputes, connecting this analysis to discussions about backlash against
ICs and studies of IC authority. Part V provides a brief conclusion.
II
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MEGA-POLITICAL
CASES
By definition, a mega-political dispute involves societal and political conflict.
Any adjudicatory intervention is invariably part of this conflict, and adjudication
might contribute to conflict resolution, conflict exacerbation, or have little to no
impact whatsoever. This Article will suggest that a focus on the particular conflict
may be too limited, but given the interest in how international adjudication
impacts specific conflicts and controversies, this Part briefly turns to the vast and
varied literature on conflict resolution as a framework for thinking about how
international adjudication of mega-politics might influence the resolution of
either the case-specific conflict or the larger, mega-political conflict.
The conflict literature examines interpersonal, societal, and inter-state
conflicts. Thus, it includes conflicts ranging from managerial concerns up to
militarized civil wars. The central finding is that conflicts are only resolved when
conflict participants agree to a mutually satisfactory solution. This may seem
obvious, but its implications are profound. James Wall and Ronda Callister
undertook a meta-analysis of this literature, distilling its insights and constructing
a conflict map that situates any dispute resolution process (in their words, the
“core process” of conflict resolution) into the larger process of conflict
resolution.9 Figure 1 below identifies three linkages, each of which are separate
cause-and-effect pieces of the conflict cycle.

9. See generally James A. Wall, Jr. & Ronda Roberts Callister, Conflict and Its Management, 21 J.
MGMT. 515 (1995) (reviewing conflicts and the conflict management literature).
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Figure 1: Wall and Callister’s Conflict Cycle Framework10

This special issue applies this framework and asks how the core process of
international adjudication impacts the dispute at hand (linkage 2) and the megapolitical issue more generally (linkage 3). Wall and Callister’s larger point is that
these linkages are interrelated. To focus only on the effects of the core process
(linkage 2) without considering how the resultant effects are or are not related to
the conflict’s root cause (linkage 1) may generate faulty expectations. One may
think that a beneficial direct effect will impact the parties to the conflict, but the
core process may actually do very little to resolve the underlying conflict.11 In the
best-case scenario, the core process generates a positive feedback effect that
mutates and dampens the larger conflict. In the worst-case scenario, the core
process exacerbates the conflict by satisfying one group while angering another.
Yet the more likely outcome is that there is no appreciable feedback effect
(linkage 3), either because the root cause remains unaddressed or because the
partisans are not ready to put aside their differences.
In sum, the conflict cycle framework indicates that two separate steps must
be considered when exploring how international adjudication impacts megapolitical conflicts. The first step is whether adjudication contributes to the
resolution of the concrete and delineated dispute that generated the legal suit.
Resolution of the particular conflict could in itself be beneficial insofar as
mobilized stakeholders find satisfaction, and perhaps especially egregious
problems will then be addressed. The second step (which may or may not follow)
is adjudication generating a positive feedback effect at the domestic or
international level. This feedback beneficially mutates the conflict to engender
positive changes, if only by jarring participants out of their position of repose.
Case specific facts are going to matter for these linkages. For example, when
a territorial dispute is truly only about the land in question, it might be resolved
by adjudication. When larger political issues are at stake, however, adjudication
may not be enough to resolve a dispute. Contrasting the Bahrain-Qatar and
South China Sea territorial disputes helps to elucidate this point. The facts in both
disputes are roughly similar in that the land in question was uninhabited, and its
monetary value laid in its divisible fishing and mineral rights. For over a hundred
years, the Bahrain and Qatar dispute was mostly about loyalties and promises the
10. Id. at 516.
11. Id. at 526–30.
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British Empire had made to local leaders. After oil was discovered in 1934, the
British government in 1939 and the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1986 tried and
failed to resolve the dispute.12 In 1991, the conflict was transferred
(controversially) to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Adjudication was
protracted, yet it “had its own rhythm. Where mediators sought compromises
that both sides could endorse, judges simply proceeded through each step of the
litigation process.”13 With specific disagreements resolved by judicial fiat, and
with the entrenched rulers having died, the ICJ’s ruling (which split the difference
and did not greatly upset the status quo created by Britain) established a border.14
It helped that sentiments in society more broadly were not inflamed, and that the
new leaders wanted to move on from the older generations’ fights.
By contrast, the South China Sea case was dormant for many years because
neither side could nor wanted to enforce their conflicting claims. This territorial
dispute is now mega-political because China moved on to occupy and transform
the contested islands into military bases, thus linking its land claim to historical
Chinese visions of its dynastic past. The issue has also become mega-political
because all parties involved see the dispute as a harbinger of China’s geopolitical
intentions in the larger region. As was also the case in the Bahrain-Qatar dispute,
one of the parties insisted that they had not consented to adjudication. It is hard
to say whether the Philippines-China arbitration made the dispute worse, or if it
simply had no impact. But the difference between the two cases comes down to
the perspectives of the parties in each case: the Bahrain-Qatar parties wanted
their dispute resolved, while the parties to the South China Sea dispute refuse to
compromise.
Given that a specific controversy may have root causes that are far larger than
the case at hand, all parties involved have choices to make. Litigants can choose
to pursue the case legally, perhaps with the goal of mobilizing supporters, scoring
a symbolic win in a larger battle, or because they simply believe that the law is on
their side. Judges can choose to avoid a substantive ruling through the avoidance
techniques discussed in the first article of this special issue,15 or they can engage
the merits of the case.16 The conflict cycle framework identifies different ways
that ICs may engage. Should they engage the merits, one option is for judges to
formalistically focus on interpreting the relevant law without directly considering
the impact of their legal interpretation on the case at hand or on the larger issue
12. The details of this controversy, and why the controversy was resolved through adjudication, are
discussed in THE NEW TERRAIN, supra note 4, at 172–78.
13. Id. at 176.
14. See id. at 172–78; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 112, ¶ 41 (July 1); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 50 (Feb. 15); Maritime
Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), Judgment, 2001
I.C.J. 40, ¶ 252 (Mar. 16).
15. Given this special issue’s collective goal of exploring what happens when ICs engage in highly
controversial issues, it is unsurprising that for each of this special issue’s contributions, the IC chose to
engage. However, the possibility of not engaging is still a highly relevant consideration.
16. Alter & Madsen, supra note 1.
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at stake. Especially if a substantive ruling might generate an adverse feedback
effect (linkage 3), intentionally ruling in a way that has no significant impact on
the case or the larger controversy may make sense. Another option is to focus
only on the specific case itself, narrowly resolving the legal dispute (linkage 2).
Both are plausible ways for courts to proceed, yet courts might also consider the
feedback effect of the ruling (linkage 3). ICs may also decide that the imperative
of justice or the rule of law requires them to issue a ruling that probably will
generate a feedback contestation. The existence of these different possibilities
means that the “legal” choice of focusing only on the law as applied to the facts
of the particular case will, in any event, be a choice, and the core process of
adjudication will have an effect, assuming judges are reflexive about the broader
conflict. Yet it might also be the case that no matter what choice the judges make,
the ruling will be contested, and the underlying dispute will persist. This will likely
be the case if the litigants are at an impasse regarding a disputed issue.
Our interest includes ICs’ and litigants’ strategic engagement with the specific
case at hand as well as the empirical consequences of adjudication for the larger
conflict. In light of the conflict cycle framework, it is possible to distill a set of
potential adjudicatory impacts. The greatest impact would be to mutate the
underlying dispute so as to address some if not all of the root causes by instigating
positive feedback (linkage 3). The next greatest impact would be to help
contribute to resolving the specific controversy involved in the lawsuit (linkage
2). A third and different outcome might be the strengthening of the international
normative order. In this scenario, the ruling neither affects the case at hand nor
the larger issue (so no linkage 2 or 3 impact), but it might still make a positive
systemic contribution in upholding specific international law and reinforcing the
larger normative order. A fourth possible outcome is non-compliance followed
by backlash whereby not only is the conflict not resolved, but the IC’s authority
is also damaged through the process. While it is possible to identify these
different strategic options and outcomes in the abstract as theoretical
possibilities, how courts and litigants in practice have engaged in mega-political
issues and with what consequences is another matter. The next Part addresses
this issue.
III
INTERVENING IN MEGA-POLITICAL DISPUTES: JUDICIAL STRATEGIES AND
POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
This Part considers how international judges engage and manage the
challenge of offering a ruling on the merits. The discussion brings out some of
ways that ICs engage and soften the impact of an adverse ruling, most of which
involve introducing some distance between the ruling and the root cause of the
conflict. The techniques include: 1) letting time and legal processes create a space
for the actors to themselves find a resolution, which the IC ruling then reinforces;
2) acknowledging the voice of impacted individuals while repatriating or
recognizing the principle of subsidiarity rights and, thus, states’ relative policy-
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making latitude; 3) converting a large structural issue into resolvable individual
issues; and 4) requiring state attention to the issue, guidelines, and procedures,
but without indicating a specific remedy. These strategies allow ICs to pick their
battles to a certain extent. They also allow those actors who will implement IC
rulings time and space to use political means to find a solution.17
Given that the larger goal of an IC is to instantiate respect for the normative
order it oversees, and given the system’s goal of building respect for the rule of
law, an appeal to these strategies should not be seen as a political act, as opposed
to a legal one. Rather, these are resilience techniques employed to maintain
institutional authority. The discussion that follows will identify various IC
strategies, but it will primarily focus on the implications of entering the conflict
for the dispute at hand and for the larger controversy. Using the conflict
literature’s framing, the discussion is structured around different forms of effects
on the conflicts, starting with the presumably greatest effects on mega-political
conflicts of international adjudication. Yet a number of the contributors to this
special issue reject a narrow focus on the relationship between states and ICs, or
the specific conflict, discussing instead the impact of adjudication on private
litigants and the larger normative order of the international adjudication of
mega-politics. The final discussion in this Part therefore departs from the conflict
cycle framework to consider this broader issue.
A. Greatest Conflict Resolution Impacting: Generating a Mutating Feedback
Effect
To impact both the specific dispute and the larger mega-political controversy,
an IC must issue a substantive ruling that upsets the status quo. Usually this
requires that the IC rule in favor of the plaintiff, in whole or in part, which will
likely upset the defendant and its supporters. Two of the special issue’s articles
discuss occasions of ICs entering ongoing debates and triggering feedback that
manages to resolve a meaningful aspect of the larger controversy.
Political scientists Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Michael Blauberger
examine the effects of the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU) with regard to conflicts over posted workers in European Union
(EU) member states.18 At bottom, this was a larger controversy over workers’
and employers’ rights that pitted social welfare-protecting older EU member
states against newer EU members. At first, the CJEU’s “Laval quartet” rulings,
which sought to strike a balance between free movement and collective action,
generated a storm of controversy because the rulings seemingly took the side of
the posted workers, upsetting the domestic-political bargain of the social welfare
17. See generally Laurence R. Helfer, Populism and International Human Rights Law Institutions:
A Survival Guide, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A TIME OF POPULISM: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 218
(Gerald L. Neuman ed., 2020) (reviewing a range of legal and political tools that might be deployed to
address the challenges that populism poses to international human rights law institutions).
18. See generally Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen & Michael Blauberger, The Court of Justice of the
European Union and the Mega-Politics of Posted Workers, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at
29.
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protecting member states. Yet Martinsen and Blauberger argue that the
controversy regarding the issue and the directive preceded the CJEU’s rulings.
The rulings impacted this preexisting issue by upsetting the status quo, triggering
new discussions, and opening up space for different political solutions to the
underlying issue. The authors are focused on the larger controversy of free
movement versus collective action, rather than the specific claims that
precipitated the legal rulings. In fact, there were many cases that challenged in
different ways whether the free movement of services could undercut national
social protections. For the larger mega-political issue, political actors crafted a
compromise that involved maintaining some of the posted worker rules while
also introducing subsidiary rights over other aspects of the posted worker rules.
Labor-receiving EU countries did have to compromise and change laws and
practices, but they were also able to force labor-exporting countries to adopt
practices that helped to equalize the price of foreign and local labor.
The political compromise involved “EU legislators not only codify[ing] but
often seek[ing] to modify or override case law.”19 The CJEU then approved this
agreement, applying the compromise. The larger mega-political controversy
about whether European integration should be allowed to undermine social
protections for workers, however, continues. Most recently, Poland and Hungary
challenged the legislated political compromise, and the CJEU “confirmed . . . the
amendment of the directive strengthening the rights of posted workers . . . In
other words, the Court sided with the political majorities of the EU
legislatures.”20
Legal scholars Laurence R. Helfer and Clare Ryan examine the European
Court of Human Right’s (ECtHR) engagement with LGBT issues over time.
Their discussion identifies a number of ways that the ECtHR entered the debate
while minimizing political controversy. For example, the ECtHR ruled against
the criminalization of homosexual sex only after state and social attitudes had
changed in most member states, and they later extended homosexual rights after
“[a] growing number of jurisdictions adopted anti-discrimination statutes
including sexual orientation and outlawed incitement to hatred against
homosexuals.”21 Later, to avoid a predictable conflict with new accession states,
the Council of Europe required that new members first repeal anti-sodomy laws.
The ECtHR also allowed governments “broad discretion to regulate other areas
of LGBT life.”22 Over time, however, the ECtHR got ahead of political
developments in some member states which were no longer progressively
advancing LGBT rights. While each ECtHR ruling in principle only applied to
the government and the litigants at hand, another paper by Helfer and Erik
Voeten find that these rulings had erga omnes effects of pulling lagging European
19. Id. at 53.
20. Id. at 55–56.
21. Laurence R. Helfer & Clare Ryan, LGBT Rights as Mega-Politics: Litigating before the ECtHR,
84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 66.
22. Id. at 67.
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states’ LGBT rights policies up to a higher rights-protecting level.23 So long as
social mores favored the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the litigation avoided the
mega-politics label. The ECtHR could reference an emerging consensus in
European societies, treating the European Convention on Human Rights as a
living instrument. Following the same logic, the ECtHR also combined its rulings
in some cases with deferring to local governments in other cases where public
sentiment was deeply divided. Employing the established doctrine on the margin
of appreciation, the ECtHR, for example, let governments determine whether or
not to recognize gay marriage while still insisting on its anti-discrimination
jurisprudence.24
The situation has changed, however. Helfer and Ryan suggest that the
strategy of upholding uniform anti-discrimination jurisprudence, while allowing
a margin of appreciation for some gay rights issues, has increasingly been at odds
in recent years with nationalist and populist leaders who have begun rolling back
earlier legislative advances, as well as challenging bedrock principles like gay
activists’ right to expression and association (for example, in gay pride parades).
Helfer and Ryan suggest that anti-gay state actions over the last twenty years are
putting the ECtHR on a mega-politics collision course with existing case law and
the divergent social mores of West and Central European countries. Part of the
political challenge is that gay rights litigants are associating gay rights with the
“European project” and the “idea of Europe,” while, on the other side, anti-gay
rights politicians are touting such rights as “threats to the family” and “threats to
the nation.” Given this politicization, these cases involving core European human
rights, and populist leaders actually valuing being seen as challenging Europe,
the ECtHR is unlikely to be able to rely on deference or social mores as
protection against the wrath of the spokespersons of sacred family values.
Together these two articles show that IC engagement can generate a feedback
effect that helpfully addresses some of the core issues in contention. Overall, the
CJEU stuck to its freedom of services commitments, and the ECtHR stuck to its
anti-discrimination doctrine. This does not imply that the underlying megapolitical conflicts were thereby resolved once and for all. New and more
challenging legal suits may arise, inspired by the gains of previous cases, which
might even reopen some of the original issues. Changing sociopolitical conditions
might also lead to backlash against international legal developments. As shown
by Helfer and Ryan, the rise of nationalist and populist leaders in some European
countries has also directly contributed to the re-politicization of some of the
original conflicts.

23. Laurence Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from
LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 80–84 (2014).
24. Id. at 86–88.
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B. Engagement That Resolves Disputes While Sidestepping the Mega-Politics
To generate a feedback effect, ICs need to engage the larger mega-political
controversy in their merits rulings. In the two articles just discussed, ICs did this.
Those authors suggest that the ICs’ actions helped to resolve specific litigant
demands and some of the larger core issues at stake. Moreover, if an IC provides
a remedy that ameliorates truly egregious behavior, a specific IC intervention can
dampen an already-inflamed conflict.
An IC can, however, also sidestep the larger conflict and focus only on the
dispute at hand. The conflict cycle framework would in this scenario suggest that
this type of intervention might perhaps improve the conflict that is being litigated,
while leaving larger mega-political concerns largely unimpacted. In the articles
discussed below, the ICs’ rulings did not directly address the broader megapolitical conflict from which the concrete lawsuit stemmed, yet by providing legal
remedies, upholding the law, and thereby contributing to the normative order,
the intervention arguably was nonetheless impactful.
Legal scholars Salvatore Caserta and Pola Cebulak focus on territorial
disputes by proxy (TDbP), which they define as litigants raising individualized
claims that implicitly ask the IC to intervene in larger territorial disputes:
“regional ICs deal with TDbP when they do not directly decide on who should
lawfully exercise sovereignty over a particular territory or whether a people have
the right to independence. Instead, they are called to address specific legal
questions only indirectly related to the territorial dispute[.]”25 These disputes
provide both risks and opportunities. Traditional territorial disputes are interstate cases where international borders are at the core of the dispute. In TDbP
cases, by contrast, the boundary is not at the core of the dispute, and the IC
arguably lacks the jurisdiction to directly address the broader territorial conflict.
For this reason, the IC may be justified in—and perhaps even legally compelled
to— sidestepping larger territorial controversy. For TDbP cases, a private litigant
will only have standing to raise the case if they can demonstrate a personal or
group impact. The IC can therefore focus exclusively on the impact on the
plaintiff(s). Caserta and Cebulak argue that TDbP cases generally involve the
commercial rights of stakeholders, the human rights of impacted individuals, or
the institutional responsibilities of regional or state entities.
Their empirical analysis includes the relatively weak and fragile Central
American Court of Justice (CACJ) and two of the most powerful and
authoritative ICs—the CJEU and the ECtHR. They discuss cases where ICs
ruled in favor of the claimants, and, in doing so, put individual rights above the
underlying state interests in the territorial disputes. The CACJ’s intervention
triggered adverse political responses but nevertheless helped develop the law of
the Organization of Central American States and generated symbolic victories in
support of the litigants. There was, however, no resolution of the broader mega-

25. Salvatore Caserta & Pola Cebulak, Territorial Disputes by Proxy: The Indirect Involvement of
International Courts in the Mega-Politics of Territory, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 123.
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political controversies. The CJEU’s TDbP cases have included both intraEuropean territorial disputes and European policies that speak to territorial
disputes in Israel and Palestine. In these cases, the CJEU eschewed the
opportunity to draw on relevant UN Security Council resolutions, treating the
issues as self-contained questions of EU law. Caserta and Cebulak suggest that
this formal legal strategy implicitly means that the CJEU stayed loyal to the
policy of European governments.26 In theory, IC engagement could have
exacerbated the larger mega-political conflicts, but the authors find that the
CJEU’s ruling had little political impact since the rulings mainly reiterated the
position of the EU with regard to the larger conflict while also addressing
delineated and somewhat isolated issues pertaining to EU law.
Whereas the CJEU’s cases have been commercial in nature, the ECtHR’s
TDbP inter-state and individual cases, by definition, concerned human rights,
and, for jurisdictional reasons, steered clear of the topic of territorial delineation.
A particularly contested issue concerns protracted proceedings related to land
rights after the de facto division of Cyprus in 1974. These highly divisive cases
only began to be resolved by the ECtHR some two decades after Cyprus’s
division. By engaging only the human rights dimensions of the underpinning
mega-political dispute, the ECtHR’s interventions have generally validated the
rights of individuals and the larger human rights normative order. As a result, the
ECtHR has converted larger disputes into questions of economic compensation,
which in these cases have amounted to significant amounts. The authors suggest
that this type of intervention can help to reframe the issue as one of human
security, one that impacts the survival, livelihood, and dignity of people. If the IC
can then help to address the needs of affected peoples, judicial intervention may
keep the conflict from becoming even more heated.27
The rulings have not, however, changed the underlying mega-political
dispute. Caserta and Cebulak’s discussion of the central Loizidou case
demonstrates how the after-the-ruling proceedings have been deeply
politicized.28 Turkey initially opposed paying damages “as a matter of
principle.”29 After seven years, Turkey accepted that compensation was owed for
denying access to the property, but the government never restored the property
to the claimant. The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers remains
unsatisfied, and the issue remains unresolved.
A second case involving the same mega-politics issue was Cyprus’ inter-state
case against Turkey, which concerned both Turkey’s treatment of GreekCypriots during its invasion of Cyprus and its dealings with Turkish Cypriots and
the Gypsy community in Northern Cyprus. The inter-state case was politically
explosive. Turkey refused to participate, and its government eventually ignored
26.
27.
28.
58007.
29.

Id.
Id.
Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 1531/89, (Dec. 18, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001Caserta & Cebulak, supra note 25, at 143.
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the ECtHR’s ruling. In 2010, Cyprus made another attempt at the same issues
and sought compensation for affected individuals, but the court’s ruling was once
again largely ignored by Turkey. Seen together with the other cases related to the
mega-political issues surrounding Cyprus, it is unclear how the court’s ruling will
impact the resolution of the underlying political conflicts. While non-compliance
or partial compliance has hampered these cases, the ECtHR’s rulings have
clarified the rights of individuals and supported the relevance of the Council of
Europe’s normative order. In other words, these cases may matter more for
future litigation even if the individual claims and the larger mega-political conflict
remain unresolved.
C. When the Dispute Itself May be Beside the Point
This special issue embraced the conflict cycle framing to generate realistic
expectations for the impact of IC engagement in particular mega-political
controversies. A number of articles in this special issue, however, suggest that
such a framing is too narrow. This Part outlines findings from three contributions
where the authors focus on how adjudication affects the larger normative order
that ICs are engaged in developing and upholding.
Legal scholars James Thuo Gathii and Olabisi D. Akinkugbe analyze the
international adjudication of election disputes by African ICs and African
Supreme Courts. Their article challenges the conflict cycle framing’s focus on
whether IC intervention has an impact on the conflict or case at hand. In some
cases, IC intervention did generate substantive wins for litigants. For example,
the Economic Community of West African States Court issued two provisional
orders barring Benin from excluding the plaintiffs from the elections.30 In other
cases, African ICs sided with the plaintiffs and ordered remedies, such as the
payment of fines.31 Compliance on the part of the government (which did not
always occur) is, in Gathii and Akinkugbe’s view, not the measure of success or
impact. Instead, they offer a litigant-centric perspective, valuing what plaintiffs
hoped and were able to achieve through their international legal appeals. The
article achieves this perspective by including many quotes indicating how litigants
and opposition parties viewed these judicial rulings. As a whole, it is clear that
both legal stakeholders and judges are demanding their democratic rights,
making democracy work, defending national constitutions, and upholding the
rule of law. Especially in the context of emerging African democracies, these
actions and outcomes are important and new. Even if the defendant government
then ignored the international legal ruling, exposing electoral malpractice and
galvanizing supporters remains both the intended and a highly valued impact.
Gathii and Akinkugbe also stress that the context of adjudication really
matters. Multi-party elections and judicial checks are relatively new arrivals in
Africa, entering African politics in the 1990s as part of the third wave of
30. James Gathii & Olabisi D. Akinkugbe, Judicialization of Election Disputes in Africa’s
International Courts, 84 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 181.
31. Id. at tbl.1.
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democratization. While the judicialization of some issues has generated scholarly
controversy in some Western countries, with scholars questioning whether
judicialization helps and who it helps, Gathii and Akinkugbe explain that some
African governments’ hegemonic political power extends to controlling the
electoral apparatus, including the judiciary. In such a context, that litigants can
appeal to ICs and in so doing “publicize their grievances and galvanize their
supporters, in addition to creating an opportunity for the government to have to
answer for its conduct in a forum that it does not control.”32
The article also discusses specific examples of election litigation and provides
an in-depth analysis of the complex context of electoral improprieties in Africa,
including the many failed efforts to have those issues addressed at the national
legal and political level, as well as at the international political level. The final
cases Gathii and Akinkugbe discuss involve recent national supreme court
decisions, from 2017 and 2020, where the Malawi and Kenyan Supreme Courts
overturned election results. The Malawi and Kenyan rulings applied new
understandings of election laws and of the role of supreme courts in interpreting
these laws. The authors’ point is that the boundaries of election laws, the role of
African ICs, and the role of African Supreme Courts are being redefined by the
litigation that their article addresses. Not only are transformations of norms and
interpretations in neighboring countries poorly captured by the conflict cycle
framework, but a purely domestic focus also misses how adjudication of election
disputes in African ICs contributed to these new important Supreme Court
rulings.
Political scientists Silvia Steininger and Nicole Deitelhoff consider the role of
criminal law enforcement and human rights jurisprudence in violent conflicts.
They are not per se interested in the heated controversy over whether IC
intervention in conflict zones deters violence or if it may actually prolong war by
encouraging combatants to fight to the bitter end in order to avoid prosecution.33
Even if one could measure a court’s impact on violence, they argue that
counterfactual thinking about if it
would . . . have been better (for the court, for the norm, for the society) if the issue had
never been adjudicated – does not hold much promise for international courts in
situations of violent conflicts. The establishment of specific courts and their handling of
particular cases is historically contingent, which means the inclusion or exclusion of
international courts in situations of violent conflict is not predetermined and a different
fate of specific courts and conflicts is possible.34

Instead, they discuss different ways that IC intervention may impact the specific
32. Id. at 190.
33. There is an extensive debate on this topic, with complicated and nuanced findings. See generally
DANIEL KRCMARCIC, THE JUSTICE DILEMMA: LEADERS AND EXILE IN AN ERA OF ACCOUNTABILITY
(2021) (discussing how accountability can both deter atrocities and contribute to ongoing atrocities);
Hyeran Jo, Beth A. Simmons & Mitchell Radtke, Conflict Actors and the International Criminal Court in
Colombia, J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST., Dec. 4, 2020, at 1 (analyzing Columbian conflict as a case study for
conflict actors in the International Criminal Court).
34. Silvia Steininger & Nicole Deitelhoff, Against the Masters of War: The Overlooked Functions of
Conflict Litigation by International Courts, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 121.
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conflict.
They see IC intervention as transforming violent conflicts into legal disputes
that can actually be addressed in ways that help victims have their day in court
and builds a historical record of what happened. The larger dispute is in this way
disaggregated into pieces, some of which can be legally redressed. Relatedly,
international adjudication provides a particular forum for the parties to engage
with each other that is quite different and removed from what happens on the
killing fields. Another function, according to the authors, is that IC intervention
might well help shore up the international normative order and thus have future
effects on international criminal law and future conflicts. In sum, Steininger and
Deitelhoff suggest that to understand the functions and effects of international
law and its subfields of human rights and international criminal law, one needs to
look beyond the conventional focus on whether litigation is contributing to
ending the specific conflict. Focusing on the broader normative developments of
international criminal law might also contribute to less violence and a peaceful
resolution of entirely different conflicts.
Legal scholars Hélène Ruiz Fabri and Edoardo Stoppioni consider how
controversies over the jus cogens category of international law are illustrative of
how international legal suits can be proxies for underlying mega-political
struggles.35 While many issues related to jus cogens controversies are pitched as
questions of sovereignty pertaining to both international legal sovereignty and
Westphalian sovereignty concerns,36 the mega-political nature of these conflicts
typically derives from larger, more fundamental disagreements. These
disagreements typically center around the direction of international law and
inherent tensions in international law pertaining to its post-colonial
transformation. For example, the authors quote a French diplomat who stated
that when people bring up jus cogens, he “pulls out his gun.”37 They further
explain: “reverting to France’s stance, it is quite clear, even if not explicitly stated,
that their reluctance towards jus cogens is based on the fear that jus cogens would
develop in the direction of criminalizing colonization or declaring nuclear
weapons unlawful.”38 Jus cogens, from this perspective, is a tool to further certain
agendas, replacing traditional international lawmaking by transforming natural
law principles into norms of customary international law. The use of jus cogens
in this way collides, fundamentally, with the idea of a state’s sovereign right to
choose which international obligations they are willing to accept. The authors
note: “The mega-political nature of jus cogens is evident from the fact that it
revolutionizes the traditional paradigms of the international legal order. Jus
cogens embodies in international law a claim for profound structural

35. Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Edoardo Stoppioni, Jus Cogens Before International Courts: The MegaPolitical Side of the Story, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2021, at 153.
36. See Stephen Krasner, The Persistance of State Sovereignty, in INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND
INSTITUTIONS IN TIME 39, 41–42 (Orfeo Fioretos ed., 2017) (discussed in Alter & Madsen, supra note 1).
37. Fabri & Stoppioni, supra note 35, at 153.
38. Id. at 172.
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transformation, which this article has called the tectonics of mega-politics.”39 Jus
cogens, thereby, becomes in itself mega-political with regard to how to define
what international law is binding on sovereign states.
As shown by Ruiz Fabri and Stoppioni, even if ICs are rarely in a position to
actually solve the underlying geopolitical and mega-political disagreement
underpinning jus cogens cases, they can participate in the ongoing process of
settling and developing the normative order of international law by articulating
jus cogens. Like in the situation of African election disputes where, according to
Gathii and Akinkugbe, the larger litigation goal was to support bottom-up efforts
aimed at future reforms, jus cogens disputes are in many cases better understood
as aiming for future changes in the structure of international law. Ruiz Fabri and
Stoppioni consider this point in detail, arguing that jus cogens could be a tool for
countering Western hegemony in international law and its institutionalized order.
More precisely, they argue that jus cogens is potentially an emancipatory
mechanism for third world countries in the post–Cold War era. However, so far
legal practices vary greatly “between the homeostatic conservatism of courts
unwilling to accept its iconoclastic potential, and the activism of courts that see it
as the promise of a new paradigm in international law.”40 The key point they are
making is that the procedural avenue of jus cogens is underexplored, yet it offers
counter-hegemonic actors a pathway for rethinking the international system by
furthering actio popularis, erga omnes, and inter-systemic linkages between
different international legal regimes and courts.
IV
MEGA-POLITICS INDUCED BACKLASH AGAINST INTERNATIONAL COURTS
The preceding Parts have outlined ways in which IC involvement in megapolitical cases impacts the substantive controversy or the specific dispute. A
related question is whether engaging highly-contested issues might adversely
impact an IC. The central concern is that an adverse ruling might provoke a
backlash against ICs or lead to a loss of IC authority. This Part first briefly
reiterates what earlier studies of backlash against ICs have already found, notably
that backlash efforts against ICs rarely succeed.41 This Part further develops this
point, analyzing the work of scholars that increasingly looks at political attacks
on ICs as evidence of a growing backlash against international courts,
international judicialization, international institutions and the liberal
international order, more generally.
Most backlash studies focus on government-led efforts to dejudicialize or
otherwise clip a court’s wings (for example, by firing judges, cutting budgets, and
limiting litigant access). This Part reframes this idea as “backlash as

39. Id. at 172.
40. Id. at 174.
41. See, e.g., Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak & Micha Wiebusch, Special Issue – Resistance to
International Courts Introduction and Conclusion, 14 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 193, 195–196 (2018).
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dejudicialization.” This type of backlash is especially interesting for scholars who
see ICs as agents or functional servants of the states that create them. Yet
scholars writing about backlash as dejudicialization find dejudicialization to be
extremely rare. This Part reframes this backlash in terms of the more likely
outcome: “backlash as contestations over authority.” This type of backlash
matters if ICs are thought of as trustees of the international legal order in which
they participate. The special issue’s introduction drew on Karen J. Alter,
Laurence R. Helfer, and Mikael Rask Madsen’s authority framework,42 noting
that international judges need to worry about how a broader set of audiences,
which includes national judges, bar associations, and the public, might react to IC
authority. Contestations over IC authority are not, however, only (or even
mostly) an artifact of ICs issuing rulings that key audiences dislike. Instead, most
scholars see authority contestations as an indication of and natural response to
the growing authority of international institutions.43 In essence, the reason that
litigants want to adjudicate mega-politics is precisely because ICs have authority
and influence, and this authority and influence is in turn why the losing parties
are likely to adopt vocal and public de-legitimation campaigns. Even if
dejudicialization is not politically achievable, these contestation campaigns can
also harm ICs.
A. Backlash as Dejudicialization
Most studies of backlash against ICs focus on state-orchestrated backlash
responses, where member state governments actively sought to reverse or
eradicate an IC ruling, to eliminate an IC, or to substantially alter its jurisdiction
or structure in order to avoid future adverse rulings or render the IC more
politically subservient. These measures exemplify a degree of backlash as
dejudicialization caused by IC intervention in mega-politics. But to demonstrate
the validity of the backlash causal claim, the political response must itself be a
reaction to specific IC rulings.
Backlash as dejudicialization should be seen as an extraordinary response
that does not typically result from a specific IC ruling. The previous Part
considered that IC rulings might upset the status quo, generating compromises
that perhaps reverse in whole or in part the IC’s ruling. This is exactly what
happened with respect to the Posted Worker Directive discussed by Martinsen
and Blauberger, who see the CJEU’s intervention as having contributed to
resolving the larger controversy regarding the Directive. We agree that to the
extent that states want disputes to be resolved, provoking a response wherein
42. See generally Theorizing Judicialization, supra note 4.
43. See, e.g., Jonas Tallberg & Michael Zürn, The Legitimacy and Legitimation of International
Organizations: Introduction and Framework, 14 REV. INT’L ORGS. 581, 588–89, 594–95 (2019) (exploring
how global governments are legitimized and delegitimized); Michael Zürn, Martin Binder & Mathias
Ecker-Ehrhardt, International Authority and Its Politicization, 4 INT’L THEORY 69, 71, 73 (2012)
(explaining that there is increasing politicization in international courts, which is often met by public
contestation). See also MICHAEL ZÜRN, A THEORY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2018) (suggesting that
today, world politics naturally create resistance and contestation due to structural power imbalances).
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stakeholders reach a new agreement is not something that ICs should either do
or actively avoid. Backlash as dejudicialization is, however, fundamentally
different because rather than make agreements to circumvent an IC ruling, states
are attempting to permanently remove an issue from the IC’s legal purview by
circumscribing litigant access or changing an IC’s mandate.44
In practice, dejudicialization in its various forms (eliminating an IC, stripping
jurisdiction for whole classes of cases, defunding, changing standing or access
rules, exiting treaties, et cetera) is hard to achieve because of the unanimity
required to change a court’s basic mandate.45 Many scholars therefore view
dejudicialization as extreme and unlikely because other tools, including ignoring
a ruling, working out a political settlement, or narrowly interpreting a legal
ruling, are more easily used by states.46 Not on this list is the possibility that states
might use appointment politics to create a more politically pliable international
judiciary. IC judicial appointments are often, although not always, politically
contested decisions.47 Yet because of countries getting to select their home-state
nominee and the difficulty (and often impossible task) of coordinating likeminded states in a way that fundamentally reshapes the composition of judges on
an IC, appointments rarely lead to politically stacked ICs. In this sense, the

44. Abebe and Ginsburg define dejudicialization as “the complete removal from judicial cognizance
of a policy issue that had previously been subject to judicialization.” Daniel Abebe & Tom Ginsburg,
The Dejudicialization of International Politics?, 63 INT’L STUD. Q. 521, 521 (2019). Given that when ICs
serve as inter-state dispute settlement bodies they generally have jurisdiction over any legally presented
dispute, removing a mega political issue entirely from an ICs’ cognizance may be procedurally impossible.
Accordingly, a softer definition may be necessary. See also Wayne Sandholtz, Yining Bei & Kayla
Caldwell, Backlash and International Human Rights Courts, in CONTRACTING HUMAN RIGHTS 159, 160
(Alison Brysk & Michael Stohl eds., 2018).
45. Exit may be a unilateral decision. Whether exit is actually or perceived to be a sanction is an
open question. In any event, there are many reasons that states exit agreements and IC jurisdiction. See
generally Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005) (explaining why treaty exit
occurs); Emilie Hafner-Burton & Laurence Helfer, Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from
Human Rights Treaties, 65 INT’L ORG. 673 (2011) (arguing that derogations are rational in the face of
political uncertainty).
46. Abebe & Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 525–26 (discussing other strategies short of
dejudicialization that may not lead to backlash, such as rewriting the legal rules or adding new provisions
that make future adjudication far less likely; for example, requiring human rights claims to be filed within
months of the alleged violation).
47. See generally Cosette Creamer & Zuzanna Godzimirska, The Job Market for Justice: Screening
and Selecting Candidates for the International Court of Justice, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 947 (2017)
(discussing how governments use their power to appoint IC judges and how they are influenced by
interstate politics and other candidate-specific factors); Manfred Elsig & Mark A. Pollack, Agents,
Trustees, and International Courts: The Politics of Judicial Appointment at the World Trade Organization,
20 EUR. J. INT’L RELS. 391 (2012) (examining the deeply politicized process for Appellate Body
appointments); Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the
European Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669 (2007) (examining dissents in the ECtHR that
show activism tendencies of IC judges); Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments,
2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387 (2009) (evaluating the politics of IC judicial appointments); Karen J. Alter,
Delegation to International Courts and the Limits of Re-contracting Political Power, in DELEGATION AND
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 312 (Darren Hawkins et al., eds., 2006) (considering why
appointment politics and other sanctioning mechanisms are rarely used in practice) [hereinafter
Delegation to International Courts].

CONCLUSION (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2021]

1/13/2022 1:31 PM

BEYOND BACKLASH

237

domestic strategies employed to diminish judicial autonomy (for example, forced
retirements, shorter term limits, or firing sitting judges) may not be transferable
to the international level.48
None of the articles examined in this special issue find a direct link between
litigating specific mega-political issues and a dejudicialization effort directed at
the IC adjudicating the case, but this could be because they examined megapolitical controversies rather than rulings that generated a political backlash.
When Erik Voeten focused on dejudicialization efforts, he however also found
that these backlash efforts seldom succeed.49
Because dejudicialization in practice is difficult to achieve, Daniel Abebe and
Tom Ginsburg suggest that a more likely state response will be a feedback
reaction where the court continues to exist, but participants vote with their feet
by not bringing new cases, participating in legal processes, and paying attention
to IC legal rulings.50 Given that mega-politics cases can reach ICs in many
different ways, a state decision to stop engaging with it will, however, not stop an
IC from entering into a mega-politics issue, as shown in some of this special
issue’s contributions. These other forms of reactions are not seeking to formally
dejudicialize an IC, but they might still contribute to a diminution of its power
and authority. The next Part addresses these strategies.51
B. Backlash as Contestations Over Authority
Drawing on Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer and Mikael Rask Madsen’s
analytical framework for understanding ICs’ de facto authority, this special
issue’s first article defined IC authority as “a court’s ability to project its ideas
and values about the law and to have these projects reflected by, or even
internalized in, the actions of individuals, groups and organizations in society.”52
For mega-political issues, this would mean that the IC is able to instill respect for
international law, the international rule of law, and the IC’s particular
interpretation of the law into the implicated state or among a set of similarly
situated legal, political and social actors in the highly-contested issue area.
Conversely, backlash as contestation over authority, by building a consensus
amongst constituent states against the IC, would seek to lessen transnational
support for the ruling, the law, the institution associated with the IC, and the IC.

48. Delegation to International Courts, supra note 47, at 319.
49. See Erik Voeten, Populism and Backlashes Against International Courts, 18 PERSP. ON POL. 407,
409–11 (2020) (noting that out of twenty-seven instances of attempted backlash between 1990 and 2020,
only one effort was successful, but also finding that unilateral exit was among the more successful
strategies).
50. Abebe & Ginsburg, supra note 44, at 523–26.
51. There is surprisingly little scholarship focused on the efforts of states to delegitimize an IC. One
exception is a study that examines how states discussed WTO appellate body rulings in the Dispute
Settlement Body. See generally Cosette D. Creamer & Zuzanna Godzimirska, (De)Legitimation at the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 275 (2016).
52. KAREN J. ALTER, LAURENCE HELFER & MIKAEL RASK MADSEN, INTERNATIONAL COURT
AUTHORITY 13 (2018).
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States would contest IC authority in this way to build support for that state’s
decision to ignore an IC ruling or to encourage domestic and foreign audiences
to see the behavior that gave rise to the adjudication as an issue of national
choice.
Unlike backlash as dejudicialization, where governments are driving the
process, for backlash as an authority contestation, upset actors are appealing to
the IC’s broader constituency, including legal advisors in other countries,
national judges around the world, the broader legal and scholarly community,
and especially the public.53 Well-informed international judges will be attuned to
these larger audiences, especially since they may be impacted by the judges’
rulings and indispensable allies for sustaining IC authority. In other words, even
if there is agreement among all the member states to change the IC’s mandate—
an exceedingly rare occurrence in practice—backlash-inspired contestation will
play out in a broader field of actors, many of whom will seek to counter the
hostilities against the IC.54 Because ICs’ different audiences are independent and
not organically linked, ICs may find that they lack the ability to influence specific
litigants (what Alter, Helfer and Madsen call narrow authority) at the same time
that they maintain support in the legal field (what Alter, Helfer and Madsen call
extensive authority), public support (aka popular authority), and the support of
similarly-situated potential state and substate litigants (what Alter, Helfer and
Madsen call intermediate authority).55 The political influence and power of ICs
grows both as the jurisdictional reach of ICs grow and as audiences within and
outside of the litigating state embrace an IC’s legal rulings and its authority. The
converse is also true, however. An IC’s de facto authority can be diminished or
undermined if fewer audiences accept the binding nature of IC rulings in general
or for certain issues. The key point made by Alter, Helfer and Madsen is that to
understand ICs’ de facto authority and reach, it is necessary to explore these
different audiences’ engagement with the rulings of ICs.56
Anti-IC politics can spiral into a larger assault on international law, the
international institution associated with the contested law, and the international
liberal order more generally. Insofar as an IC’s intervention can be framed as a
violation of sovereignty or an existential threat to a valued and deeply held
principle, it may not matter if the IC’s ruling actually impacts the case or issue at
hand.57 Should mobilized partisans have a larger goal of absolute national
sovereignty, then a broader and more encompassing backlash politics will not
stay within the rational realm of political leaders conducting cost-benefit analysis
of whether dejudicialization is feasible or if they can lessen the impact of an IC
53. Id. at 31–36.
54. See Alter et al., supra note 8, at 318–326 (discussing the varied backlash outcomes and the role
of major stakeholders).
55. This is discussed at length in Madsen et al., supra note 41, at 193.
56. See Alter et al., supra note 52, 33–36.
57. For more on how backlash politics foments resentment through framing an action as a threat to
deeply held values, see Roger Petersen, Emotions and Backlash in US Society and Politics, 22 BRIT. J.
POL. & INT’L RELS. 609, 611, 616 (2020).
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ruling through other means. Even if such options are on the table, partisans are
likely to vociferously advocate for a full-throttled return to majoritarian politics
with fewer international legal checks and balances. Supporters of populist
backlash politics may also be willing to destroy crucial norms, like the idea that
international law or democratic norms are a standard of legitimate behavior. This
type of politicization may impact an ICs’ authority, even if it does not lead to
dejudicialization. Given the volatility of backlash politics where specific goals and
objectives can morph and change so that a compromise that addresses one
demand may simply generate another demand, the intersection of mega-politics
and backlash politics is obviously risky for ICs.58 Should partisans have these
larger goals, IC resilience strategies may be insufficient insofar as the mere
possibility of international judicial involvement in the future may be seen as
objectionable in some quarters.
Thinking about backlash politics through the broader lens of ICs’ de facto
authority allows us to better comprehend how the international adjudication of
mega-politics entails judicial risks other than formal dejudicialization. ICs
engaging in mega-political cases enter a conflict cycle where, as discussed above,
they can chip into the process of resolving mega-political disputes in various
ways. At the same time, they also risk becoming associated with certain positions
of the preexisting conflict. In conflicts fueled by nationalist and populist
sentiments, ICs might even be viewed as part of an issue over which the parties
are at an impasse.59 Whatever the impact on the specific mega-political issue, a
full-throttled backlash politics might adversely impact an IC’s de facto authority
in some segments of society, and these actors may in turn disengage or sideline
the IC in different ways. The reverse outcome, however, is also possible. Countermobilization can mobilize support and reinforce support for the law and the IC.60
V
CONCLUSION
Building on the contributions to this special issue, this Article has sought to
address the implications of adjudicating mega-politics for the cases being
litigated, the larger conflicts from which the cases stem, and the ICs involved.
Contrary to perhaps reasonable expectation, the studies included in this special
issue show ICs successfully navigating the fraught terrain that is the adjudication
of mega-politics. In some cases, the ICs were able to constructively contribute to

58. This type of backlash politics is discussed in Karen J. Alter & Michael Zürn, Conceptualizing
Backlash Politics: Introduction to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison, 22 BRIT. J. POL. &
INT’L RELS. 563, 565–77 (2020) and Karen J. Alter & Michael Zürn, Theorising Backlash Politics:
Conclusion to a Special Issue on Backlash Politics in Comparison, 22 BRIT. J. POL. & INT’L RELS. 739,
740–51 (2020).
59. Helfer and Ryan’s contribution to this special issue suggests this, insofar as they argue that gay
rights have become associated with the European project. See Helfer & Ryan, supra note 21.
60. Lisbeth Zimmermann, Nicole Deitelhoff & Max Lesch, Unlocking the Agency of the Governed:
Contestation and Norm Dynamics, 2 THIRD WORLD THEMATICS: A TWQ J. 691, 699–701 (2017).
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resolving the dispute (for example, contestation over European law regarding
posted workers, discussed by Martinsen and Blauberger). In other cases, such as
those discussed in articles by Caserta and Cebulak and by Gathii and Akinkugbe,
international adjudication did not resolve the underlying conflicts, but
nonetheless, it arguably made a number of positive contributions to future cases
or the normative order that ICs are trying to reinforce. Other contributions,
notably the articles by Steininger and Deitelhoff and by Ruiz Fabri and
Stoppioni, show how bringing mega-political issues before ICs can be part of
long-term strategies of building support for the normative order in ways that
empower previously overlooked actors and interests. Helfer and Ryan’s
contribution, however, shows that even when an IC seemingly has contributed to
resolve a conflict in the short and medium term, sociopolitical conditions can
change in the member states. Previous victories may lead to reopening the
contestation and putting ICs in increasingly challenging situations vis-à-vis their
prior stance, with the risk of adverse reactions.
The international adjudication of mega-politics did not result in
dejudicialization or a direct attack on an IC in any of the cases examined in this
special issue. This suggests that the strategies discussed in Part II of this Article
can work to navigate mega-political disputes. Equally important is the
relationship with the key audiences of ICs, as discussed in the parts on megapolitics–induced backlash against ICs. As suggested, backlash against ICs is both
a broader phenomenon than dejudicialization and one that needs to be
understood in the context of both the forces seeking to limit ICs’ formal authority
and those countering such attempts. Differing from the dominant states-centric
focus on dejudicialization in most research, our reconceptualization opens for
assessment of the complex constellations of actors who contribute to either
reinforcing or reducing IC authority across different audiences.
A final note pertains to Ran Hirschl’s concern that the adjudication of megapolitics could contribute to an antidemocratic juristocracy.61 On the one hand,
this special issue’s findings challenge Hirschl’s original concerns. With the caveat
that the special issue only focuses on ICs—and not comparative analysis of
constitutional courts—our findings generally suggest that the turn to ICs in the
context of mega-political questions tends to reinforce basic tenets of the rule of
law, including due process and human rights. The translation of political issues
into legal issues also, at least in some instances, helps transform an open-ended
and larger conflict into a delineated set of questions which are more resolvable.
Arguably, an IC’s more limited and indirect role in adjudicating mega-political
issues can contribute to also solving the larger conflict in the longer term. IC
intervention may, counterintuitively, also be more manageable politically since
international judgments for the most part need to be implemented. ICs, then, set
in motion a particular legal-political process that involves many actors and seeks
to strike a balance between the need to implement a ruling and a desire to find

61. See Hirschl, supra note 6, 169–210.
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politically acceptable solutions. IC rulings are, in other words, somewhat more
flexible than those of domestic courts and function as external contributions to
resolving internal conflicts. That said, Hirschl could well argue that insofar as the
current international law reflects a preference for liberal values—human rights,
market openness, checks and balances and limited national sovereignty—IC
intervention in mega-politics also serves to reinforce the hegemony of those who
support the international liberal order. This would be a twist on Hirschl’s original
concern, and not really a concern shared by supporters of democracy and human
rights.
Overall, and much to our own surprise, this special issue’s findings seemingly
run counter to the conventional depiction of backlash against ICs when
adjudicating mega-political questions, where IC rulings risk provoking adverse
reactions and even exacerbating conflicts. This typical media depiction of the
international adjudication of mega-politics has inspired some research, but it may
not adequately examine how IC intervention in mega-politics might generate a
search for new ways to resolve conflicts and new counter-mobilizations that build
political support for the existing international order. This by no means implies
that ICs are the best institutions for resolving mega-political disputes or
fragments of such disputes. The conflict resolution literature makes the key claim
that to solve a conflict, the conflict participants need to agree on a mutually
satisfactory solution. ICs rarely provide such solutions, but they can in some
instances help directly-impacted individuals and provide some important
contributions to the larger goal of finding mutually agreeable solutions.
The growing judicialization of international relations, or its reversal, is an
ongoing and still unfolding history. If partisans respond to growing
authoritarianism by raising more international judicial appeals, and ICs maintain
the support of significant audiences, IC authority may remain strong, and support
for judicialization may even grow, precisely because delegation to ICs can
reinforce the influence of international law. The current climate of ICs is,
however, particularly fraught and marked by a growing pushback against
multilateralism coming from many fronts. At least in the short term, then, an
increase in mega-political issues being brought before ICs may be expected,
driven by the disjuncture between national politics and international law.
Ultimately, this special issue suggests that ICs can be resilient actors in pushing
back against these political headwinds.

